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Abstract
While monetary policy decisions are mainly taken by Committees (as
is the case for the ECB, or for the Federal Reserve), the literature largely
stands on the …ction of a single central banker, be it (or not) a conservative
one. The purpose here is to consider explicitly the plural dimension of
monetary policy Boards, and to investigate the consequences of such a
decision structure for monetary policy rules.
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Since the …rst day of the European Central Bank’s life, and even before, observers
and commentators have been worried of political pressures on the Bank, but also
of opinion divergences inside the Board. The …rst kind of coercion on mone-
tary policy has been prevented by the adoption of the so-called Stability Pact,
even if everybody knows it does not prevent bashing (a term coined by Waller,
1991) exercised by political leaders on the Bank. That should be no surprise, as
this kind of ’chicken’ game between monetary and …scal policymakers belongs to
untold rules of the political scene. Yet, at least on pure theoretical ground, its
implications and potential dangers are now well known (see, for example, Persson
and Tabellini, 1995).
Hence for political pressures, but what about the divergences of insiders’ opin-
ion ? While monetary policy decisions are mainly taken by Committees (as is the
case for the ECB, or for the Federal Reserve), it appears that the literature has
hardly looked upon the consequences of such a decisional structure. It is rather
mainly based on the opposite assumption, of monetary policy being decided and
implemented by a single policymaker, be it (or not) a conservative one. However,
it is now well documented that ”central banks are no uni…ed actors”, as Von Ha-
gen (1999, p.682) puts it. This author, for example, even identi…es three opposite
groups inside the Bundesbank Board, each group having di¤erent objectives for
monetary policy. Our objective here is thus to integrate explicitly the plural di-
mension of monetary policy Boards, and to investigate the consequences of such
a decision structure for monetary policy rules.
Our framework is a simple one-period model with time consistency problems.
We simply depart from the literature by considering delegated monetary policy to
a Board where two types of agents confront. We consider the source of divergence
to lie in di¤erent views (due to ideological in‡uence or simply lack of knowledge)
about the functioning of the economy. In the model, this comes from di¤erent
judgments about the slope of the Phillips curve (the relative e¢ciency of monetary
policy on real variables). We show that, in this context, considering opinion diver-
gences leads to several conclusions. First, we exhibit the possibility of a political
business cycle, one that has rarely been highlighted, induced by the appointment
of new central bankers at the Board. Second, we show that traditional solutions
to the in‡ation bias (i.e. performance contracts, in‡ation targets and conservative
central bankers) depend on the uncertainty raising from ideological divergences.
As a consequence, implementing these solutions should be considered cautiously.
2However, we also show, as a third result, that societies will, on average, be better
o¤ when monetary policy is delegated to a Board than when it is left to elected
leaders.
The …rst section thus develops the model, and considers monetary policy de-
cisions in the absence of delegation. In the second section, we expose how explicit
consideration of Board’s opinions heterogeneity can question traditional solutions
to the time consistency problem, in part because of the bank’s appointment in-
duced business cycle. The conclusion follows with re‡ections on further research.
2. Monetary policy by elected leaders
We start from a standard one-period model of monetary policy with time consis-
tency and stabilization problems, as Barro and Gordon (1983) and Rogo¤ (1985)
…rst introduced. The model is extended to include electoral uncertainty, as in
Alesina (1987, 1988) : two political parties compete and, once elected, the (leader
of the) winning party selects the monetary policy according to its own preferences.
The preferences of each party are given by a loss function assigning a penalty to
deviations of in‡ation from an optimal level, ¼¤, and to deviations of output from























Thus, we assume political parties to share the same objectives, but to disagree
on their relative weight. We will assume here ½ < ±, hence party D is relatively
more concerned by output stabilization.
Where we depart from the literature is when we consider parties to have di-
vergent preferences because of insu¢cient (or ideologically oriented) economic
knowledge : each party believes the economy to conform to its own views, i.e.
each party gives output stabilization a weight conform to its vision of the eco-
nomic process. We assume the weight given to output stabilization is related (for
simplicity, we suppose here it is strictly equal) to the slope of the expectations-
augmented Phillips curve :
y
D = ±(¼ ¡ ¼
e) + " (2a)
3y
R = ½(¼ ¡ ¼
e) + " (2b)
Output is (traditionally) assumed to be a function of surprise in‡ation1, plus a
random error shock, ", normally distributed with mean zero and variance equal to
¾2
". It isthe parties’ desire to stabilize output at a level greater than y¤ that creates
the time consistency problem, with political competition just adding uncertainty.
But here, uncertainty does not only emerge from the political process, but because
the political process is driven by ideological perceptions of how the economy works
: the bigger each party will perceive the slope of the Phillips curve, the higher it
will be incited to stabilize output.
Above hypothesis has - to our knowledge - never been endorsed, either by
the time consistency literature or by the political business cycles one. We think
that omission drives the literature further from realism, given the existing, still
controversial, economic knowledge and given the importance economic variables
have in political parties’ platforms, without even mentioning the question of how
economic disturbances in‡uence votes. To have neglected that ideological bias,
the literature may have proposed solutions to time inconsistency problems that
may become critically ‡awed, as should become clear below.
Within this context, during a period, the sequence of events is the following :
…rst, wage-setters lock in wage contracts; then elections occur. Once elected, the
winning party observes shocks hitting the economy and sets up monetary policy
(we assume, as standard, the policymaker to control ¼). When engaging in their
contracts, wage-setters must make (rational) prior beliefs about elections results.
We assume electoral probabilities to be exogenous, with party R elected with
probability (1 ¡q) and party D with probability q. Hence, everything happens
as if the economy could be described by the following process :
y = qy
D + (1 ¡ q)y
R = ¹(¼ ¡ ¼
e) + " (3)
where ¹ ´ q± + (1 ¡ q)½. As shocks cannot be expected by wage-setters,
policymakers have a rationale for output stabilization. Of course, in this context,
no commitment technology is exploitable, and the discretionary solution applies.
Routine optimization under rational expectations(minimizing(1a) and (1b) under
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The solutions come in the traditional form, composed of an in‡ationary bias
and a stabilization policy term. As in Alesina (1987, 1988), the solution is a¤ected
by both partisanship and political uncertainty. It is nowwell-known that increased
polarization and (thus) political uncertainty increase both in‡ation and output
‡uctuations (see Alesina and Gatti, 1995), a result that also emerges from our
slightly modi…ed model. Several solutions have emerged in the literature to …ght
this uncertainty and reduce both the average in‡ation bias and the politically-
induced variance of in‡ation and output : these range from Rogo¤’s (1985) con-
servative central banker to Walsh’s (1995) optimal contract and Svensson’s (1997)
in‡ation targets. These solutions have been shown to reduce the theoretical time
consistency problem and have sometimes been empirically implemented. Yet, to
date, they are still hotly debated issues, on purely theoretical grounds as well
as relatively to their empirical relevance and implications (see, between others,
Waller, 1995, on optimal contracts, Forder, 1998, 1999, on independence, and
Mishkin, 1999, on targets).
In our view, the debate is at least partly due to the omission of two empir-
ically important facts of monetary policy decisions : …rst, they are taken while
economists have no consensual views on how and how much money in‡uences the
economy (as is clearly perceptible in Walsh, 1998). Second and, we believe, even
more consequential, the proposed solutions all lie on the simplifying assumption
of a single policymaker deciding on monetary policy. But, concretely, monetary
decisions are taken inside Boards, that is to say are taken after being debated
in deliberating assemblies. And, as the news and minutes accounts of monetary
decisions show, those are sometimes hotly debated ones. Thus, a crude fact is
that there is no single-minded central banker, but monetary policy committees.
The next section, by endorsing the opposite assumption, shows how painful the
…ction of a single peopled / minded policy Board can be.
3. Delegation to a policy Board
We …rst consider how opinions heterogeneity inside the Board can in‡uence mon-
etary policy, even opening the door to a certain kind of political business cycle.
We then derive the implications for traditional solutions to the time consistency
5problem. The section ends in showing why societies may nevertheless pro…t from
delegating policy to a Board.
3.1. Partisanship inside the Board
We will now suppose monetary policy to be delegated to an independent central











which, at least apparently, stands on the traditional assumption of a single
policymaker. However, as we believe the reality of policymaking Boards to be a
relatively con‡icting and partly heterogeneous one, we will consider F to be the
aggregate function of an institution peopled by (to keep things simple) two kinds
of deciders, in proportion p and (1 ¡ p) :
F = pL
k + (1 ¡ p)L
c (5’)
Central bankers are thus of two kinds, sharing the same objectives but with























where we assume : · > °, i.e. one kind of policymaker weights more output
stabilization than the other one. Hence the central bank global loss function
is the weighted aggregation of (6a) and (6b). We will suppose for the moment
relative proportions of each kind of deciders to be exogenously given, with p being
the part of deciders of the k type. In (5), we thus have : µ ´ p· + (1 ¡ p)° =
p(· ¡ °)+°. As above, we assume policymakers to disagree about the functioning
of the economy, each kind of central banker having in mind a di¤erent value for
the slope of the Phillips curve when asked about monetary policy decisions :
y
k = ·(¼ ¡ ¼
e) + " (7a)
y
c = ° (¼ ¡ ¼
e) + " (7b)
6and thus :
y ´ py
k + (1 ¡p)y
c = µ(¼ ¡¼
e) + " (7c)
Equations (7a) and (7b) are related to each kind of central banker, while the
last one is the aggregate function applying when collegial decisions are taken.
Everything happens thus as if the preceding competing parties had adopted
an independent central bank to avoid politically induced business cycle. However,
the agreement included provisions giving each party a given number of seats inside
the newly designed policy Board. The committee thus re‡ects, at least partly, the
society’s ideological divisions. The politically induced ‡uctuations have then been
clustered inside the Board, while they precedingly were frontpage news.
Another way, which we believe an even more pertinent one, to think about the
situation we describe here is the following : suppose letters R and D no longer
signal political orientation, but countries. Then, the preceding section would
have described a political and monetary union between two historically separated
countries (or states or regions), while the present section simply describes an
economic and monetary union, with monetary policy decisions taken inside a
Board to which each country delegates its central banker (a kind of institution
the European Central Bank would be a prominent example of).
While they clearly sound like realistic descriptions, both interpretations are
hardly met in the literature, which generally stands on the …ction of an omnipo-
tent (and sometimes omniscient) central banker deciding alone on in‡ation and
stabilization decisions2. When ruling out this assumption, a better description of
the policy game in federations or in economic and monetary unions (EMUs) is
given by equations (5) to (7c). In this simple framework, discretion still emerges as











Inspection of the solution shows that delegating monetary policy to a Com-
mittee nesting people with di¤erent (possibly divergent) preferences does not rid
2An insight about both types of divergences we consider can be found, respectively, in Moser
(1999) and in Alesina and Grilli (1992). But these authors do not derive their policy impli-
cations. Von Hagen and Süppel (1994) and Von Hagen (1995) explored possible constitutions
for monetary unions, but keep the …ction of a single-minded central banking Commitee as a
reference. However, see Waller (1996) who analyzes, though in a di¤erent way, policy Boards’
heterogeneity.
7in‡ation of partisanship, embedded here in µ. As long as there can be several
interpretations of the economy and / or political polarization, in‡ation will su¤er
from a bias, should it be due to a lack of knowledge or coming from ideologically-
oriented delegation. As we will see now, this bias may even be the source of a
new kind of political business cycle, eroding further the base on which traditional
solutions lie.
3.2. Good times, bad times : insights on an in‡ation-induced political
cycle
Remember partisanship being embedded in µ ´ p·+(1 ¡ p)°, with p the relative
proportion of policymakers caring more about output (one can think, in a quite
caricatural way, that they are of a ’keynesian’ type, while others are of the ’neo-
classical’ one). As they are appointed by elected leaders, there may be swings in
relative proportions when a member of the Board ends her mandate (or resigns,
or dies). With divergent preferences, these appointments may give rise to a new
kind of political business cycle, the paradox being that it is truly induced by the
delegation process itself. This comes in contradiction with the common wisdom,
inspired by Rogo¤’s (1985) in‡uential paper, that delegation may increase welfare
by reducing uncertainty surrounding in‡ation and output stabilization.
As an illustration of that point, think of an episode of output contraction, lead-
ing to a burst of in‡ation, as the central bank tries to stabilize output. If some
members of the Committee have to be renewed3, the renewal may be in‡uenced by
recent experience, and the relative proportion of ’keynesians’ versus ’neoclassics’
will probably be time-varying. In that case, of course, relative proportions become




, with the following intuitive comparative static prop-
erties :
@p
@¼F < 0 and
@p
@y < 0 : following a burst of in‡ation, preference in renewals
should be denied to ’keynesians’ (should it be due to a preference reversal inside
the existing Board or to the appointment of a new, less ’liberal’, member) and,
when output grows far out of the target, fear of in‡ation will probably have the
same impact. Hence, any in‡ation / output variation will have some consequences
on the Board composition, and thus on in‡ation and output results. As long as
there is some uncertainty about the economy, any event can lead to preferences
3It does not matter here whether the appointment process may or may not concern the same
people. All that is necessary for the reasoning is the only possibility of preferences divergences
in the whole society. In the extreme case, as long as at least two people’s views about the
economy diverge, our reasoning applies.
8reversals : a governement can change his view of the economy, thus selecting
unlikely people to appoint. As the Board here has no more knowledge than the
political parties, we cannot preclude preferences reversal inside the Board either.
Moreover, and inversely, any variation in p will have an impact on the in‡ation
performance (from (8), we clearly have
@¼F
@p > 0 : the more numerous ’keynesians’
are, the higher the average in‡ation). Delegating is thus not enough to forbid
uncertainty in monetary policy. As long as policy will be designed by a Committee
(i.e. by more than one person), reappointments will occur, opening the door to
partisan in‡uence in monetary policy.4
One may ask how realistic this scenario is. A simple exercise will help here to
make our case more concrete : think of the European Central Bank, with policy
decisions taken by a policy Council composed of the Directoire (6 members) and
the governor of the central bank of each member of the Euro-zone, 11 people as of
1999. These governors have commonly long, non-renewable, staggering appoint-
ments of about eight years on average. Average turnover should then be higher
than one a year. Our simple one-period model is thus able to catch majority
reversals that could occur at the ECB with, following in‡ationary (resp. de‡a-
tionary) episodes, the appointment of a neoclassical (resp. keynesian) -minded
central banker.
We should add that giving life mandate would not stabilize the process, as long
as some members of the monetary policy Committee could change their minds :
after an episode of in‡ation revival, for some time at least, some ”doves” may
turn into ”hawks”, leading to majority (and thus to policy) reversal. The higher
the uncertainty about the way the economy functions, the less observers should
ignore the probability of ideological conversions.5
To sum up, we think that one can not simply preclude political business cycles
arguing of central bank independence when Committee members are heteroge-
neous and / or politically appointed. That conclusion looks even worse when
turning to other solutions that have been recently proposed to remove the in‡a-
tionary bias of monetary policy, as these solutions also lie on the assumption of a
single central banker.
4This kind of partisan in‡uence may prove less e¢cient than pure ”bashing” (Waller, 1991),
while e¢ciency in our case will depend on the quorum size of the Board. Remember also that
partisanship may come from Congressional in‡uence (see Grier, 1991). Of course, all hypotheses
are not mutually exclusive.
5Von Hagen (1999, pp.692-694) documents such a conversion occurring at the Bundesbank.
93.3. On targets and contracts
Among the proposed solutions to the in‡ationary bias of discretionary mone-
tary policy, independence, optimal contracts and in‡ation targets are prominent.
However, these solutions make reference to the delegation of monetary policy to
a selected central banker taking decisions, alone, about monetary policy. The
assumption may not be irrelevant in certain circumstances (when policy decisions
are, concretely, taken by one person or in crisis times, when there may be a kind
of ”rally round the ‡ag”, with members of the monetary Committee ranging be-
hind the Governor’s view). However, in general, we believe the assumption to be
harmful, as it delivers solutions that may not be applicable. The ”applicability”
criticism has already emerged in the literature (and notably for contracts, see
McCallum, 1995), but not on the same grounds.
What we will show here is that the targets and contracts solutions, far from re-
ducing uncertainty and distortions emerging from discretionary policy, are subject
to partisanship uncertainty.
So, Walsh (1995) showed that, by in‡icting to its central bank a penalty in-
dexed on in‡ation, a society could obtain from it the ”right” in‡ation rate, the
optimal one. The contract was then correcting the absence of a pre-commitment
technology, in an ex-post way.
Is the contracting solution relevant when monetary policy decisions are made












where ® is the penalty coe¢cient. Solving this problem in the same way as










Hence, the optimal contract writes :
® = ®(µ) = y
¤µ
2 (10)
The optimal contract can thus be de…ned, but it depends on the Board’s diver-
gences. Moreover, dueto therenewal process, the contract isnow state-contingent,
and can no longer be used as a pre-commitment technology. This reinforces Mc-
Callum’s (1995) criticism stating that the negotiation of the contract between the
10bank and the government was just a re-location of the time-consistency problem,
as the government always kept an incentive to disavow its (or its predecessor’s)
signature. When considering policy Committees with appointment process stand-
ing, without even renegotiating the contract, a government can modify its clauses,
emptying it from any tenor, simply by using the (re)appointment procedure. The
process is rather more subtle here, but no less harmful.
In‡ation targets are subject to the same criticism, of course. In that case, the
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Optimization delivers the discretionary solution under a target as :
¼







To approach the optimal (committed) solution, the government should then
de…ne the target as :




The problem still lies in the target depending on the Board’s composition
(and renewal process). The preceding remarks apply here as well. Targets are
contingent to the Committee composition and, as a consequence, may not prove
as e¢cient as claimed as a commitment technology for monetary policy.6
The preceding results raise a doubt on the e¢ciency and relevancy of proposed
solutions to the in‡ation bias, but they also raise a question, lying this time on
the positive side : Why does a society delegate monetary policy to a Committee
if its members are politically in‡uenced and may even give birth to politically
induced business cycles, hence reducing social welfare ?
3.4. Why do Boards exist
To understand why Boards may be a rational social choice, let us suppose that
the Board re‡ects political polarization exactly : everything happens here as if
political parties of the …rst section are appointing partisans to the Board, in
6Mishkin (1999, p.591) notes that one main advantage of the targeting strategy may come
from focusing the political debate on in‡ation outcomes. However, our argument still stands,
as this does not prevent debate inside the Board, even if it may limit the Bank’s margin of
maneuver.
11proportions equal to their political weight. In that case, we would have : R ´ c,
D ´ k, q ´ p, (1 ¡ q) ´ (1 ¡ p), ½ ´ °, ± ´ ·, and ¹ ´ µ. Substituting in (4a)






































To know if society is better o¤ with delegation than without, we have to verify
that in‡ation performance is better under delegation. Term by term comparison





Hence, delivering monetary policy into the members of a Board’s hands does
not systematically make society better o¤, as in‡ation may sometimes be higher
than with political leaders deciding, delivering higher losses. However, even when
the Board re‡ects society’s political degree of polarization and uncertainty per-
fectly, delegating monetary policy to a Committee delivers, on average, a better
in‡ation performance. Everything happens as if policy debates were choked o¤ in
the central bank’s conditioned rooms, where policy decisions are taken, instead of
being debated in the heated air of the political arena.
In brief, while monetary theory should consider more exactly how policy deci-
sions are taken (i.e. by somewhat ideologically in‡uenced people), it seems that
societies found in Committes delegation a way to keep policy debates alive but
hardly kicking.
4. Conclusion
We have used a simple framework to show how considering that policy Boards
are composed of heterogeous people may be important for monetary economics.
12The assumption of a single central banker should be considered as a …ction, a
sometimes useful one, but also a sometimes misleading one. We believe the latter
option to be true when considering solutions to time consistency problems : all of
them (the conservative central banker as well as performance contracts or in‡a-
tion targets) are based on the …ction, an assumption that plagues their supposed
welfare enhancing properties and / or implementability. More work thus needs
to be done to consider how e¤ective they may be when people with potentially
divergent preferences seat around a Board’s table.7
We identi…ed a (barely mentioned) source of business cycle emerging from the
appointment process or from ideological conversions of Board members. This kind
of politically induced cycle is probably one of the main impediments for solutions
to time consistency problems to be enforced.
On the positive side, including potential divergent preferences may also shed
some light into another research area. As Clarida et al. (1999) or Taylor (1999)
emphasize, interest rate smoothing is still a puzzle for monetary economists. All
things equal, considering insiders divergences may help explain slow movements
in interest rates. That hypothesis, at least, should deserve further exploration.
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